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State, Dep’t. of Bus. and Indus., Fin. Inst. Div. v. Dollar Loan Ctr., L.L.C.,  
133 Nev Adv. Op. 103 (Dec. 26, 2017) (en banc)1 
 




The Court determined that NRS 604A.408(2)(f) bars a licensee from bringing any type of 
enforcement action on a refinancing loan under the statute. This is because allowing for 




 In 2005, the State Legislature enacted a bill to regulate the payday loan industry.2 In 
particular, the bill regulated deferred deposit loans and high-interest loans.3 Normally, the loan 
terms are limited them to only 35 days, but the regulations created a 60 day extension beyond the 
original terms.4 Additional interest cannot be accrued within that period5 unless a new deferred 
loan meets specific exception requirements.6 The requirement at issue is NRS 604A.408(2)(f), 
which allows for loans to be made if the licensee, “[d]oes not commence any civil action or process 
of alternative dispute resolution on a defaulted loan or any extension of repayment plan thereof.”  
 There are varying interpretations of this statute by the appellant Nevada Department of 
Business and Industry, Financial Institutions Division (the FID); the Office of the Attorney 
General; and the Legislative Council Bureau. Because of this confusion, respondent, Dollar Loan 
Center (DLC), sought judicial interpretation. The court considered whether a payday loan licensee 




 The court reviewed the question of statutory construction de novo.7 Statutes should be 
liberally interpreted in order to “effectuate the benefits intended to be obtained.”8 In addition, 
statute interpretations must not “render any part of the statute meaningless” or “produce absurd or 
unreasonable results.”9  
 The purpose of the Legislature enacting governing deferred deposits and high-interest loans 
was to stop the “debt treadmill” where a borrower is unable to repay a loan and often has to take 
                                                 
1  By Emily Meibert. 
2  See A.B. 384, 73d Leg. (Nev. 2005).  
3  Id.  
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.480(1) (2005).  
5  Id. 
6  NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.480(2) (2005).  
7  Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. Of Nev. v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 129 Nev. 833, 836, 313 P.3d. 221,223 (2013).  
8  Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 40, 175 P.3d. 906, 908 (2008).  
9  Orion Portfolio Servd. 2, LLC v. City of Clark ex rel. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 126 Nev. 397, 403, 245 P.3d. 
527, 531 (2010).  
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out a larger loan to cover the original loan.10 This suggests that the statute has a “protective purpose” 
requiring a liberal construction to effectuate its intended benefits.11  
 The statute sets out two loan options for when a licensee and a borrower enter an agreement 
to use a new loan to satisfy the existing one.12 The first option, under subsection 1, confines the 
new loan to sixty days and does not allow for additional interest or fees to be added.13 The second 
option, under subsection 2, exempts the new loan from subsection 1 if the new loan meets certain 
requirements—including when the licensee does not commence any civil action against the 
defaulted loan.14 
 Because of the statute’s plain language, it is permitted for the licensee to offer a new 
deferred deposit or high-interest loan that is not subject to the sixty-day restriction. However, the 
licensee is still subject to all of the statutes limitations. This bars a licensee from pursuing “any 
civil action or process of alternative dispute resolution on a defaulted loan or any extension or 
repayment plan thereof.”15 
 Extension is defined as “any extension or rollover of a loan beyond the date on which the 
loan is required to be paid in full under the original terms of the loan agreement.”16 This statutory 
definition applies to an extension of the original loan. If a licensee issues a new deferred deposit 
loan or a new high-interest loan to a borrower in order to pay the balance of an outstanding loan, 
the licensee is “foregoing the right to file a civil action or institute alternative dispute resolution 
proceedings on that new loan. 
 DLC argued the statute allows for civil actions on the original loan being refinanced or a 
subsection 2 loan because the conditions of subsection 2 serve as condition precedent for a licensee 
to offer an extension. The Court disagrees, and believes this interpretation would go against 
legislative purpose of getting rid of the “debt treadmill.”  
   
Conclusion 
 
The NRS 604A.408(2)(f) bars a licensee from bringing any type of enforcement action on 
a refinancing loan under the statute. Additionally, applying A.B. 273 here was inconsistent with 
the Legislative intent to get rid of the “debt treadmill.” The Court reversed the district court’s ruling 






 The district court was correct in interpreting NRS 604A.480 to allow for enforcement 
actions. Nevada laws generally prohibit a lender who is subjecting themselves to Chapter 604A 
from issuing a new loan to pay of an existing loan. There are two exceptions to extending or 
making a new loan to pay of an existing loan,17 and the district court was correct in determining 
                                                 
10  See, e.g., Hearing on A.B. 384 Before the Senate Comm. On Commerce & Labor, 73d Leg. (Nev., May 6, 2005).  
11  See Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 40, 175 P.3d. 906, 908 (2008). 
12  NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.480 (2005). 
13  Id. 
14  Id.  
15  Id (Emphasis added). 
16  NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.065 (2005). 
17  NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.480 (2005). 
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that there are two types of arrangements that a lender can extend these loans. The first way that a 
loan can be extended, under subsection one of the statute, is for the customer to agree to the new 
or extended loan.  The second way for a loan to be extended, under subsection two of the statute, 
is for the lender and customer to agree to that the new or extended loan meets the requirements of 
subsection 2 of NRS 604A.480.  
 The dissent notes that the district court was correct when identifying that subsection two 
does not any prohibition against lenders, but rather only conditions that must be satisfied for a 
lender to be exempt from the subsection 1 prohibitions. Thus, the statute only provides that a 
licensee cannot be exempt from the requirements set forth in subsection 1 if the licensee has 
already commenced any civil action or process of alternative dispute resolution against a debtor. 
The majorities belief that the purpose of the statute is to prevent the “debt treadmill” actually goes 
against the way that they statute is written. Additionally, it goes against other sections of the statute 
that give lenders the authority to resort to civil actions to collect loans.18 Also, it would go against 
common sense— “What lender will make a new loan to pay off an existing loan knowing that, in 
doing so, the loan being made cannot be collected on default?” The dissent agrees with the district 
court and would affirm rather than reversed.  
                                                 
18  NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.415 (2005).  
